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 Executive Summary
This paper provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of the costs and benefits of
federal regulatory activities. The assessment, based on the government’s own numbers, shows that
the net benefits for final regulations promulgated from 1981 to mid-1996 approach a net present value
of $1.6 trillion. The analysis also shows that the government can significantly increase the net benefits
of regulation. Less than half of final regulations pass a neutral economist’s benefit-cost test. Net
benefits could increase by approximately $280 billion if agencies rejected such regulations. Net
benefits could also increase if agencies replace existing regulations with more efficient alternatives,
or if agencies substantially improve regulatory programs.
The efficiency of individual regulations varies by agency and by the type of risk the regulation
is designed to reduce. Regulations from the Department of Transportation comprise over half of the
total net benefits of final regulations, although they account for less than 10% of all regulations. The
net benefits of regulations from the Environmental Protection Agency account for only about a third
of total net benefits, primarily because of 19 Clean Air Act regulations with high net benefits,
although two-thirds of all regulations are EPA regulations. On average, regulations that reduce cancer
risk are less efficient than other social regulations, and EPA cancer regulations appear less efficient
than other cancer regulations. Regulations that reduce the risk of car, fire, or work-related accidents
are generally more efficient than regulations that reduce the risk of cancer and heart disease. The
study also shows that the efficiency of regulations has not declined over time, as some scholars
suggest. Furthermore, the introduction of formal regulatory oversight by the OMB does not appear
to influence the cost-effectiveness of regulations.
The paper shows that agency compliance with regulatory impact analysis requirements in
Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 and Clinton’s Executive Order 12866, the basis for agency
estimates of the costs and benefits of regulation, is usually superficial. As a result, the quality of such
analyses is generally poor. Partly because of the poor quality of analyses, it appears that agencies do
not often use the analyses to improve regulatory outcomes. If Congress and the White House are
serious about regulatory reform, they must cooperate to enforce the regulatory impact analysis
requirement. Successful enforcement requires high-level political support, statutory language
requiring all agencies to adhere to established principles of economic analysis, and rigorous review
of agency analyses by an independent entity. At this time, it is unclear whether law makers are willing
to exert the political muscle necessary to achieve real reform.1. Howard (1995).
2. The study builds on my earlier work, a study of 92 environment, health, and safety regulations from 1990 to mid-
1996, and is part of an ongoing project to track the costs and benefits of federal regulation.  I added 76 regulations to
the original database, some from 1981-1990 and some from 1995-1996. In the database, there are 115 rules from the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 28 from the Department of Labor (DOL), 13 from the Department of
Transportation (DOT), 5 from Health and Human Services (HHS), 4 from the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), 2 from Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and 1 from the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC). I did not include the last three agencies in my original analysis. The study also covers operating agencies
within the DOT not included in the original analysis, such as the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal
Railroad Administration, and the Research and Special Programs Administration. The original study only included




Assessing the Government's Numbers
Robert W. Hahn
Overview
The political earthquake that shook Washington in November of 1994 brought with it a call
for regulatory reform. The call came not just from conservative Republicans, although they vigorously
supported reform. The call also came from many Democrats, who recognized that Washington
bureaucracies were not working as well as they could and were, in many instances, standing in the
way of progress. The bipartisan support for some kind of regulatory reform stemmed from the
public’s growing awareness of the unintended consequences of government regulation. Philip Howard
highlighted some examples in his bestselling book, The Death of Common Sense.
1 Howard showed
that laws and regulations deterred Mother Theresa and the Missionaries of Charity from building a
homeless shelter in the South Bronx. An inflexible regulation also forced Amoco to spend five times
as much money to reduce one-fifth as much benzene at its Yorktown refinery than it would have
spent using an alternative approach. The message is clear—our regulatory system is broken and is
in urgent need of repair.
This paper provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of the impact of federal
regulatory activities on the economy.
2 It is based on a review of all rules with regulatory impact
analyses (RIAs) that I could locate from 1981 through mid-1996, a total of 168 final and proposed3. Agencies have produced RIAs for every regulation since Reagan’s Executive Order 12291, issued in 1981. A RIA
includes the agency’s estimates of the benefits and costs of the regulation, in addition to other information designated
in the executive order. Reagan’s order required agencies to produce a RIA for each proposed and final “major” rule,
defined generally as a rule with an estimated annual impact on the economy of $100 million or more. President
Clinton’s Executive Order 12866, issued in 1993, changed the term “Regulatory Impact Analysis” to “Economic
Analysis” and the term “major” to “economically significant,” but otherwise did not significantly change the RIA
requirement. I use the acronym “RIA” throughout this paper because it is more frequently used than “EA.” Clinton’s
order also changed the requirement that the benefits of a regulation must “outweigh” the costs to a requirement that
the benefits of a regulation must “justify” the costs. The Clinton executive order further places more emphasis on the
distributional impacts of regulations. Clinton intended the change in terminology to increase the weight attached to
unquantifiable benefits and costs in agency analyses, but it is unclear whether this change occurred. The impact of the
two orders on the regulatory process differs, not because of subtle substantive variation, but because the Reagan
Administration and the Clinton Administration implemented the orders very differently. The Clinton Administration,
for example, focused more on cooperation with the agencies.
4. The preamble often clarifies how the agency will implement the regulation, thus shedding light on the likely benefits
and costs. 
5. I use the words rule and regulation interchangeably in this paper.
6. I was not able to calculate net benefits, cost-effectiveness, and benefit-cost ratios for all rules in the database because
the agencies did not provide sufficient information to complete these calculations for all rules. 
7. Air pollution reduction benefits are from reduction in ambient levels of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, nitrogen
dioxide, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide. 
8. See, for example, Weidenbaum and DeFina (1978), Litan and Nordhaus (1983), Hahn and Hird (1991), Hopkins




3  I also examined the preamble of the Federal Register notice for each rule, which typically
summarizes the information that the RIA presents.
4,5  I estimated the net benefits of 106 final
regulations and 36 proposed regulations, calculated the cost-effectiveness of 52 final regulations and
14 proposed regulations, and estimated benefit-cost ratios for 105 final regulations and 18 proposed
regulations.
6 The net benefits of final regulations approach a net present value of $1.6 trillion. About
81 percent of the total benefits from final rules result from the estimated reduction in the risk of death,
disease, and injury. Nonfatal benefits account for about 53 percent of that total. The remaining 19
percent of benefits are from air pollution reduction, the only pollution reduction benefits consistently
quantified by agencies.
7 These benefits can include health and mortality risk reduction benefits as well
as other benefits, such as materials damages.
The analysis presented in this paper builds on pathbreaking work done at the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) beginning in the early 1980s and subsequent works by regulatory
scholars.
8,9  Officials at the OMB ranked health, safety, and environmental regulations in terms of cost-
effectiveness, and found that the cost-effectiveness of regulations varies across a wide spectrum.10. See, e.g. Breyer (1993) and Weidenbaum (1997). 
11. For a description of regulatory reform efforts since Nixon, see Hahn (1998).
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Scholars further found that agencies are not maximizing the net benefits of regulation. My study
further supports the discoveries of these scholars. The results of the studies imply that agencies
should reallocate resources to regulations with higher net benefits, or to regulatory strategies that are
more cost-effective than strategies agencies currently employ. They also imply that a more consistent
approach to regulatory analysis is necessary to ensure that agencies choose the best regulatory
policies and programs. 
Scholars have designed reform proposals that push for improvements in the regulatory
process, such as strengthened executive regulatory oversight and the increased use of economic
analysis.
10  As a result of these proposals, in addition to increasing public support for regulatory
reform, every president since Nixon has advocated some type of reform.
11  The real impact of these
reform efforts is questionable, however. This paper therefore also provides guidance for further
reform of the regulatory process. It discusses the extent to which federal agencies have cataloged
information on the benefits and costs of regulatory activities, the role of benefit-cost analysis in the
regulatory process, factors affecting the efficiency of regulation, and the relationship between a
statute’s economic analysis requirements and the net benefits of regulations from that statute. The
study shows that further use of economic analysis, as well as enforcement of economic analysis
requirements, is necessary to improve regulatory outcomes.  
In the first section of the paper, I comment on the quality of agency estimates of the costs and
benefits of regulation. In Section II, I present the key analytical results concerning the net benefits
of federal regulations for which the agency provided enough information to calculate net benefits. I
also estimated the cost-effectiveness of selected regulations. Section III evaluates the relationship
between the wording of statutory economic analysis requirements and the efficiency of regulations.
In the fourth section, I discuss whether regulatory impact analyses have improved the regulatory
process. Finally, I conclude with suggestions for further regulatory reform. 
I.  How Complete Are the Government’s Numbers?12. Clinton’s Executive Order 12866, which builds on Reagan’s executive order, requires agencies to include the
following information in a RIA: a statement of the potential need for the proposal, an examination of alternative
approaches, an assessment of benefits and costs, the rationale  for choosing the regulatory action, and a statement of
statutory authority.    
13. Grubb et al. examined all RIAs prepared in 1981 and attempted to determine whether the requirements of Executive
Order 12291 had improved regulatory outcomes (Grubb, Whittington, and Humphrey, 1984). The General Accounting
Office reviewed three Environmental Protection Agency analyses and made several recommendations to the agency
to improve future analyses for rulemaking (GAO, 1984). In response to the GAO’s recommendations, the EPA
evaluated sixteen RIAs prepared in the first five years after Reagan issues Executive Order 12291 (Environmental
Protection Agency, 1987a). After briefly summarizing each analysis and subsequent regulatory decision, the EPA
discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the analyses and outlined ways to improve their usefulness. The OMB
evaluated nine RIAs from five different agencies on the basis of several criteria including: whether there was a
discussion of market failure, an evaluation  of suitable alternatives, a reasonable treatment of uncertainty, a clear
statement of the baseline, and an appropriate use of discounting (Office of Management and Budget, 1988). In related
articles, Fraas  (1991) and Fraas and Luken  (1991) reviewed the U.S. experience in using economic analysis to develop
environmental policy. The authors noted tremendous variation  in the quality and role of the analyses and then
highlighted three well-prepared EPA RIAs that were important in the policy process. McGarity reviewed five RIAs
from four agencies with a detailed examination of bureaucratic processes associated with regulatory development
(McGarity, 1991). Goodstein, examining two RIAs in detail, sought to answer whether the EPA was doing good
analyses and whether the analyses influenced decisionmaking (Goodstein, 1995). Rusin et al. evaluated six EPA RIAs
and one Occupational Safety and Health Administration RIA (Rusin et al., 1996). They examined whether each  RIA
discussed the need for regulatory activity, evaluated possible alternatives, estimated benefits and costs, and provided
a rationale for choosing the proposed action. In the most comprehensive review of individual RIAs to date,
Morgenstern examined the role of economic analysis in environmental decisionmaking (Morgenstern, 1997). In that
study, twelve EPA RIAs were evaluated by separate authors with a particular focus on estimated impacts and the value
of RIAs in regulatory decisions.
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As a result of Reagan’s regulatory impact analysis requirement in Executive Order 12291,
more information about the benefits and costs of federal regulation is available than ever before.
12  The
agency RIAs do not, however, generally adhere to established principles of benefit-cost analysis and
are not subject to review by an independent entity. As a result, the information provided in RIAs
tends to vary in quality and quantity by agency and by type of regulation. The evaluation of the
benefits and costs of regulation is therefore more difficult than it would be if the agencies applied a
consistent analytical approach. Nevertheless, many scholars have used the RIA data to evaluate the
regulatory process.
13  The work of these scholars, as well as the analysis presented in this paper, has
generally focused on agency compliance with economic analysis requirements in the Reagan and
Clinton executive orders and the quality of agency analyses. Scholars have found that the information
provided in the RIA is often not complete, and that the level of detail and analytical sophistication
varies across agencies and types of regulations. Common deficiencies cited throughout much of the
literature include inadequate consideration of alternatives, poor treatment of uncertainty, incomplete14.  The General Accounting Office has conducted three additional studies within the last three years that support these
conclusions. See GAO (1997), GAO (1998), and GAO (1999). 
15. Hahn (1996).
16. While industry has an incentive to overstate costs in materials it provides to the agency, the agency has some
discretion to determine which cost estimates to use.
17. See, e.g. Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson (1999) for an alternative perspective. While these authors find costs
are overstated in many cases, they also find that the assumed level of compliance is overstated.  Thus, the bias in costs
estimates is less clear for any given level of compliance.  See also OMB (1998) for a discussion of this issue.
18. The benefit and cost numbers developed throughout this paper are based on agency analyses, many of which are
incomplete. Nonetheless, the numbers summarize the official information that is publically available.
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estimation of benefits and costs, as well as various methodological errors.
14  The analysis presented
in this paper supports the findings of other regulatory scholars related to the quality of agency RIAs.
My analysis of RIAs shows that they lack analytical consistency and that agencies only
superficially comply with the requirements in the Reagan and Clinton executive orders. I found, for
example, that the discount rate used by the agency varies across regulations, and agencies do not
always indicate the year in which specified benefits and costs apply. Agencies may show such
information only in particular years instead of presenting full streams of benefits and costs. Perhaps
most importantly, in many cases the agency did not complete its quantitative analysis of benefits or
cost savings. Since the lack of quantification makes it difficult to hold agencies accountable for their
decisions, I closely examined the quantification issue. I examined the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) particularly carefully because other scholars have noted that the EPA tends to quantify
benefits and costs less than other agencies.
In this analysis, I do not address whether the numbers contained in the RIAs are biased,
although it is an important issue. I have argued elsewhere that I believe that agencies are likely to
overstate net benefits.
15  I argued that bureaucrats in agencies have an incentive to overstate benefits
and understate costs.
16,17  Rather than repeat the arguments contained in my 1996 study, let me simply
state that the issue requires more thorough research. Moreover, I am dubious that it will be resolved
in a way that satisfies different interest groups. Ultimately, I believe that the solution rests on devising
an institutional structure that gives agencies the incentive to provide less biased information.  The
focus of this study is to evaluate the government's numbers, however, regardless of bias. 
Table 1 shows the number and percentage of regulations for which agencies quantified some
part of benefits and costs.






DOT  EPA HHS HUD USDA
Number of Rules
b 168 1 15 13 13 115 5 2 4
Costs/Savings Assessed164 1 15 13 13 111 5 2 4
98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 100% 100% 100%
Benefits or Cost Savings Assessed
c 146 1 15 13 13 95 5 2 2
87% 100% 100% 100% 100% 83% 100% 100% 50%
Human Health Impacts Estimated 94 1 15 12 9 49 4 2 2
56% 100% 100% 92% 69% 43% 80% 100% 50%
Benefits Monetized 44 1 1 3 4 26 5 2 2
26% 100% 7% 23% 31% 23% 100% 100% 50%
a. The following acronyms are used in the scorecard:  CPSC=Consumer Product Safety Commission; DOL=Department of Labor; DOT=Department of
Transportation; EPA=Environmental Protection Agency; HHS=Department of Health and Human Services; HUD=Department of Housing and Urban
Development; USDA=United States Department of Agriculture
b. The scorecard includes 121 final rules and 47 proposed rules. 
c. This category includes fatal and nonfatal human health benefits from reduction in the risk of cancer, heart disease, lead poisoning, and car, fire, and
workplace accidents, termed "Human Health Impacts." It also includes benefits from pollution reduction and any other benefits or cost savings that the
agency quantified or monetized.19. Agencies often differentiate between compliance costs and cost savings resulting from a rule. Cost savings generally
take the form of avoided costs of cleanup, property damage, resource replacement, litigation, and training, in addition
to savings from waste minimization, productivity gains, fuel economy benefits, and savings based on the value of lost
product (e.g., from oil spills). I combine cost savings and benefits in this analysis, although economists generally
believe that most estimates of cost savings are implausible. Cost savings imply that regulations can save companies
money, and therefore that some companies are not maximizing profits. In my database, for example, the inclusion of
cost savings leads to 10 regulations that save money. In addition, cost savings are difficult to estimate and are probably
much smaller than agencies predict. See van der Linde and Porter (1995) and Palmer et al. (1995) for a discussion of
cost savings.
20. I define health benefits as benefits resulting from cancer, heart disease, and lead poisoning risk reduction. I define
safety benefits as benefits resulting from a reduction in the risk of disabling injuries, injuries that require a person to
miss work, and injuries that do not require a person to miss work. Disabling injuries are permanent, while the other
injuries are temporary. By definition, these injuries result from car, fire, and workplace accidents, or the malfunction
of consumer products.
21. Rules addressing safety risks estimate the benefits from mortality and morbidity reduction in all but two cases. In
contrast, rules addressing health and environment risks estimate these benefits about half the time. Note that all
agencies, except for the Department of Labor, are not distinguished by the type of regulatory risks they address. My
analysis of the Department of Transportation, for example, includes ten safety rules as well as three U.S. Coast Guard
rules aimed at oil pollution prevention in the health and environment category.
22. OSHA is a part of the DOL. I divided the DOL regulations in my database into health and safety categories for my
analysis because of the large number of rules in each of these categories relative to other agencies. All DOL Health
regulations referred to throughout the paper are OSHA health regulations. DOL Safety regulations are OSHA safety
regulations and Mine Safety and Health Administration regulations. 
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Agencies assessed benefits, cost savings, or both for 87 percent of the rules. The EPA and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) are the only agencies that did not assess benefits, cost savings, or
both for all regulations.
19 An agency’s decision to quantify the benefits of a regulation or cost savings
appears to depend on the specific agency and the type of regulation. For example, agencies quantified
benefits with measurable human impacts, such as mortality and morbidity, for 56 percent of rules.
Agencies addressing safety risks estimate benefits with human impacts more often than agencies
addressing health and environmental risks.
20 This can be explained, in part, because some
environmental risks, such as those attached to ecosystem degradation, are difficult to quantify.
21  Fewer
agencies attempted to monetize the benefits of the rule than to quantify its physical effects. While the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) monetized benefits for
all rules, only about one-fourth of all rules included monetized benefits. A few agencies, such as the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), often highlighted significant cost savings.
22
Less than a third of the rules with quantified benefits include monetized benefits. I relate this
difference, in part, to specific
agency policies stemming from statutory limitations restricting the consideration of benefits or costs.23. Examples include a rule assessing the extent to which general federal actions conform to state or federal
implementation plans under the Clean Air Act, a rule outlining the operating permits program of the Clean Air Act,
and a rule promulgating data requirements for pesticide registration. The EPA only qualitatively described the benefits
of these rules.
24. Numerous rules promulgated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act estimate the amount of waste
affected by the rule. If the agency did not quantify the pollution reduction benefits, however, I did not include the rule
in the “Pollution Reduction Quantified” category in table 2.
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The OSHA, for example, is restricted from using a benefit-cost framework as a basis for health
standards. While the agency quantifies significant benefits with human impacts in all fifteen rules
examined in this study, OSHA monetized those benefits in only one case. I later examine the
implications of attaching a dollar value to quantified benefits that the agency did not monetize. 
Table 2 shows a detailed breakdown for the EPA because the majority of regulations
promulgated from 1981 to mid-1996 are EPA regulations. The table  shows that the agency assessed
costs for nearly all of their rules, but did not quantify benefits or cost savings for twenty of the rules.
Many of the rules lacking benefit estimates are process-oriented,  such as rules that require third
parties to gather information or outline the structure of government programs.
23  The benefits of
process-oriented rules are often difficult to identify, much less quantify. Almost two-fifths of the
regulations quantify benefits with measurable human impacts, but only one-half quantify the benefits
of pollution reduction.
24  Only 23 percent actually monetize such benefits. 
II.  What Do the Government’s Numbers Tell Us?
As is clear from the previous section, the government’s numbers are often the result of
incomplete, and sometimes even flawed, analysis. Nevertheless, the government’s numbers are the
only available source of data on which it is possible to base a comprehensive review of major
regulations. I therefore used these estimates to aggregate the net benefits of regulation and to identify
factors that explain variation in regulatory efficiency. I only report, however, the conclusions that I
believe are defensible despite weaknesses in the original data. My assessment of the government’s
numbers yields four important conclusions. First, aggregate estimates of agency net benefits basedTable 2:  Regulatory Scorecard: Breakdown for Environmental Statutes, 1982 to Mid-1996
a
EPA CAA CERCLA CWA FIFRA RCRA SDWA TSCA
Number of Rules
b 115 62 5 14 2 19 8 5
Costs/Savings Assessed111 61 5 13 2 17 8 5
97% 98% 100% 93% 100% 89% 100% 100%
Benefits or Cost Savings Assessed
c 95 55 0 12 1 17 7 3
83% 89% 0% 86% 50% 89% 88% 60%
Pollution Reduction Quantified 63 54 0 8 0 1 0 0
55% 87% 0% 57% 0% 5% 0% 0%
Human Health Impacts Estimated 49 20 0 6 1 13 7 2
43% 32% 0% 43% 50% 68% 88% 40%
Benefits Monetized 26 13 0 7 0 2 3 1
23% 21% 0% 50% 0% 11% 38% 20%
a.The EPA is the primary agency responsible for implementing the following environmental statutes: CAA=Clean Air Act; CERCLA=Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; CWA=Clean Water Act; FIFRA=Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act;
RCRA=Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; SDWA=Safe Drinking Water Act; TSCA=Toxic Substances Control Act
b.The scorecard includes 82 final rules and 33 proposed rules.
c.This category includes fatal and nonfatal human health benefits from reduction in the risk of cancer, heart disease, lead poisoning, and car, fire, and
workplace accidents, termed "Human Health Impacts." It also includes benefits from pollution reduction and any other benefits or cost savings that the
agency quantified or monetized.25. The database primarily consists of “major” and “economically significant” regulations, as defined by Reagan’s and
Clinton’s executive orders. It includes a few rules that may not be considered major in their final form, but I evaluated
them on the presumption that they could be major. Although the CPSC is not covered by the executive orders, I
included one rule from the CPSC that probably would have been designated as “major” if it was subject to review. I
also reviewed rules from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which voluntarily complies with many executive order
requirements.
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on the government’s own numbers are positive. Second, the government can increase the net benefits
of regulation. Less than half the rules pass a neutral economist’s benefit-cost test. Net benefits would
increase substantially if agencies rejected such rules. Third, net benefits exhibit a wide range,
suggesting that a reallocation of regulatory resources could increase the aggregate net benefits of
regulation. Fourth, it is possible to explain some of the variability in regulatory efficiency using
regression analysis. Regulations designed to reduce cancer risks, for example, are less cost-effective
than other regulations. More research is necessary to fully understand why significant variation exists,
however. In this section, I describe the methodology I used to aggregate and compare the
government’s estimates of the benefits and costs of regulation, the results of the sensitivity analysis,
and the results of a regression analysis designed to explain the observed variation in efficiency
between regulations. 
Methodology
I used the government’s numbers provided in the regulatory impact analyses to aggregate the
benefits and costs of regulations from 1981 to mid-1996, to determine which regulations pass a
benefit-cost test, and to identify factors that explain variation in regulatory cost-effectiveness
estimates.
25  My analysis of the RIAs takes agency estimates of the impact of regulations on the
economy as given. I use these agency estimates to calculate the present value of the benefits and costs
of a particular regulation or regulatory alternative. I then calculated the net benefits of each
regulation, defined as the difference between benefits and costs, and aggregated the net benefits of
all regulations. I also calculated the net benefits of regulation by agency, and by environmental
statute. I further calculated the cost-effectiveness of regulations by dividing the cost of the regulation
by the benefits, such as the number of lives saved. 
To make the analysis consistent across different programs and regulations, and to allow for26. See Hahn (1996, 216–19).
27. This terminology is somewhat misleading and has led to unnecessary controversy. Economists are trying to measure
what people are willing to pay for small changes in the probability of reducing different kinds of health and safety risks,
not the value of saving a life.
28. Viscusi (1993).
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aggregation of net benefits, it was necessary to convert all dollar estimates to the same dollar base
year to correct for inflation, and to further discount all dollar estimates to reflect the social
opportunity cost of investing in the regulation. I first used the Consumer Price Index to convert all
annualized estimates of cost and benefits for each regulation to 1995 dollars. Next, I aggregated the
benefits and costs of each regulation using the base year of implementation identified by the agency
in the RIA. If the agency did not identify a base year, I used the year after the date the agency
published the regulation in the Federal Register as the base year. Finally, I calculated the present
value of net benefits of all regulations using 1996 as the base year. If a rule reported costs or benefits
from a  year after 1996, for example, I discounted values back to 1996. Likewise, if a rule had
benefits and costs before 1996, I discounted the values forward to 1996. I describe the impact of
varying the base year on my final estimates later in this section, when I discuss the results of my
analysis. 
I also introduced a common discount rate because agencies often chose different discount
rates for their analyses. The real discount rate for the base case is 5 percent, with 3 and 7 percent used
in the sensitivity analyses. I discussed the choice of discount rate in more detail in my original study.
26
I also monetized some benefits that the agencies chose not to monetize. For health risk reduction
regulations, agencies often provided estimates of the number of lives the agency expected the rule to
save, in addition to the number of injuries the agency expected the rule to avert. To monetize these
benefits, I used standard willingness-to-pay estimates based on labor market studies of risk-dollar
tradeoffs for fatal and nonfatal risks. Willingness-to-pay estimates represent the amount an individual
is willing to pay to reduce a specified risk or to protect the environment. The willingness-to-pay to
avoid a risk of fatality is referred to as the implicit “value of life.”
27  The value of life for the base case
is $5 million, with values of $3 and $7 million used in the sensitivity analyses.
28  I further used a
consistent set of willingness-to-pay values for reducing nonfatal risks of injury and disease, called a29. Unless otherwise noted, I updated all estimates to 1995 dollars by using implicit price deflators for the gross
domestic product from Council of Economic Advisers (1997).
30. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and Federal Highway Administration (1991) and Viscusi
(1992).
31. I did not include disease and injury benefits that did not fit into fatality index categories, and I therefore may have
understated benefits. Examples include reductions  in diseases unique to only one or a few regulations, such as incidence
of reduced IQ levels as a result of lead exposure. When agencies monetized  these benefits, I included agency valuations
in an alternative scenario. While aggregate benefits increase by less than 5 percent, the inclusion of those
nonstandardized benefits is significant in a few rulemakings. For example, a 1992 Health Care Financing
Administration rule addressing clinical lab improvements had annual costs of over $1 billion in selected years. Using
a willingness-to-pay model for improved laboratory conditions and information on the cost of false negatives and
positives, the Health Care Financing Administration determined that the benefits ranged from $.5 billion to $5 billion
annually. The agency did not specify the year dollars in the rule, but presumably the estimates are in 1991 or 1992 year
dollars. As I am skeptical of some of those numbers, I include them only in an alternative scenario.
32. I did not take the estimates of the benefits of pollution reduction directly from any particular study. I based the
estimates on a review of a variety of studies, the most important of which are Harrison et al. (1992), Rowe et al. (1995),
and the EPA’s RIA for municipal waste combustors (Environmental Protection Agency 1994). I believe the final
estimates represent a reasonable range of estimates. Al McGartland of EPA reviewed these estimates and offered
valuable feedback, but he is in no way responsible for the final choice of estimates. More refined estimates would take
into account the level of pollution, population density, and differences in seasonal effects.   
33. All agencies, including the EPA, did not often provide quantified estimates of environmental benefits other than
air pollution reduction benefits. My analysis therefore only includes air pollution reduction benefits. To calculate the
total benefits of a rule, I combine the benefits from health and safety risk reduction with the benefits from air pollution
reduction. The estimates of air pollution reduction benefits may, however, include some benefits from morbidity and
mortality risk reduction, in addition to environmental protection. There is consequently a possibility of overlap between
the air pollution reduction estimates and the health and safety risk reduction estimates because both may include
mortality and morbidity reduction benefits. The effect of this overlap is small, however, because it pertains only to the
benefits from cancer risk reduction. Of all the pollutants included in the analysis, only the estimates of the benefits of
particulate matter and sulfur dioxide reduction appear to include mortality benefits. These mortality benefits do not
significantly overlap with the cancer risk reduction benefits, and I therefore do not believe that the overlap affects the
results of my analysis.
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fatality index, since these values also varied by agency.
29  I value a chronic disease or disabling injury
at one-third of a life, workday-lost injuries at one-hundredth of a life, and non-workday-lost injuries
at one-two-hundredth of a life, based on work by the Department of Transporation's (DOT) National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and work summarized by Viscusi.
30  I adjust
nonfatal injuries from car accidents by using NHTSA’s equivalent life calculation.
31  For the value of
reducing a unit of pollution for the five air pollutants in the database, my estimates are based on
previously published studies and selected numbers from the EPA’s RIAs.
32,33  Table 3 summarizes
values for key parameters.
Unless otherwise specified, I presume that regulations will be in force for at least twenty
years. If the RIA specified a longer time frame, I used that time frame. If benefits accrued over a
longer time frame because a disease or illness has a latency period between the exposure and the Table 3:  Key Parameters of the Model
a
Low Value Base Value High Value
Discount Rate 3% 5% 7%
Implicit Value of Life$3,000,000  $5,000,000  $7,000,000 
Value of Pollution Benefits (per ton)
Carbon Monoxide $0  $0  $100 
Hydrocarbons $100  $1,000  $2,500 
Nitrogen Oxides $100  $1,000  $2,500 
Particulate Matter (PM 10) $2,500  $10,000  $30,000 
Sulfur Dioxide $100  $700  $1,000 
a.  I adjusted all dollar figures to 1994 dollars using implicit price deflators (Economic Report
of the President 1995).  I updated these figures to 1995 dollars in the rest of this paper. 34. The net benefits estimate for final rules does not include two rules on stratospheric ozone that, according to the
EPA, have net benefits in trillions of dollars. These rules are included in Table 1. While these rules probably have
positive net benefits, the EPA’s estimates probably overstate the actual benefits significantly. I therefore did not include
these rules. For a detailed analysis of the EPA’s aggregate estimates of clean air benefits, see Lutter (1998). 
35. Sixty final regulations in the database have negative net benefits, while 46 regulations have positive net benefits.
Of the proposed regulations, 18 have negative net benefits and 13 have positive net benefits. 
36. Table 4 distinguishes between gross costs and net costs because, as discussed earlier in this paper, agencies
frequently distinguish between compliance costs and cost savings resulting from a rule. Gross costs are direct
compliance costs. Net costs represent the difference between gross costs and any cost savings or additional costs
associated with the rule. I compute net benefits as benefits minus net costs.
37. I excluded rules from the net benefits calculation in three circumstances. First, I excluded general rules that
overlapped specific regulatory requirements. The EPA, for example, sets goals for the concentration levels of criteria
pollutants but separately promulgates rules to ensure compliance with those standards. Second, I excluded a few rules
for which the basis for the estimates was unclear. I may eventually enter these rules in the database. Finally, I excluded
17 rules that I determined the agency was unlikely to finalize. Seven of these 17 rules are related to the EPA’s benzene
standards, proposed in 1989 and 1990. These seven benzene decisions were part of a bundle of eleven benzene
decisions promulgated by the EPA in two major rules, although I treated them each as a separate data point. I left the
other four benzene decisions in the database 
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onset of the problem, I discount the benefits back to the present. If the stream of benefits is not given,
I discount the average annual benefits by using average latency periods. If the agency specified a
preferred alternative or scenario in the RIA or the Federal Register notice, I evaluate that alternative.
If the agency did not specify a preferred alternative, I examine an average of the most likely set of
alternatives.
The Net Benefits of Regulation from 1981 to Mid-1996
The net benefits of federal regulation approach a net present value of $1.6 trillion for final
rules and $325 billion for proposed rules.
34  More regulations in the database have negative net
benefits than positive net benefits. Rules with positive net benefits average about $40 billion in net
benefits, however, while rules with negative net benefits average -$2.3 billion.
35  Table 4 summarizes
the results of the analysis.
36  Table 5 analyzes EPA rules in more detail on the basis of specific statutes
because about two-thirds of the final rules are EPA rules. Table 4 covers thirty-two fewer regulations
than Table 1 because I excluded some rules to represent more accurately the impact of regulations
over the time period.
37  The table provides aggregate estimates for each agency as well as a combined






DOT EPA HHS HUD USDA
FINAL
Number of Regulations 106 1 9 10 9 70 3 1 3
Gross Cost $601.9 $1.3 $43.8 $20.6 $59.9 $444.0$29.0 $0.9 $2.5
Net Cost $395.8 $0.7 $43.8 -$15.3$53.1$283.6$28.5 -$0.9 $2.5
Benefits $1,948.6 $5.9 $55.0 $83.2 $997.4 $764.2 $23.9 $0.1 $18.9
Net Benefits
b $1,552.8 $5.3 $11.2 $98.6 $944.3 $480.7 -$4.6 $1.0 $16.5
PROPOSED
Number of Regulations 30 n.a. 3 1 3 19 2 1 1
Gross Cost $100.8 n.a. $2.7 $1.8 $4.0 $84.7 $3.5 $1.3 $2.7
Net Cost $37.3 n.a. $2.7 $1.8 $3.7 $65.1-$39.7$0.9 $2.7
Benefits $362.0 n.a. $4.6 $38.8 $2.9 $85.0$230.8$0.0 $0.0
Net Benefits $324.8 n.a. $1.8 $37.0 -$0.9 $19.9$270.5-$0.9 -$2.7
a.All figures are in billions of 1995 dollars. Aggregate totals may not add due to rounding.
b. I calculated net benefits by subtracting net costs from benefits.Table 5:  Net Benefits of Regulations: Breakdown for Environmental Statutes, 1982 to Mid-1996
a
EPA
b CAA CERCLA CWA FIFRA RCRA SDWA TSCA
FINAL
Number of Regulations 70 35 5 8 2 11 5 4
Gross Cost $444.0 $192.0 $34.0 $30.7 $7.6 $121.6$43.6 $14.6
Net Cost $283.6 $127.7 $34.0 $30.2 $7.6 $26.8 $43.6 $13.6
Benefits $764.2 $714.3 $0.0 $1.2 $0.0 $0.4 $48.1 $0.2
Net Benefits
c $480.7 $586.6 -$34.0 -$29.0 -$7.6-$26.4$4.5 -$13.4
PROPOSED
Number of Regulations 19 10 n.a. 4 n.a. 2 3 n.a.
Gross Cost $84.7 $34.0 n.a. $6.0 n.a. $15.7 $28.9 n.a.
Net Cost $65.1 $18.5 n.a. $2.1 n.a. $15.6 $28.9 n.a.
Benefits $85.0 $46.7 n.a. $0.1 n.a. $0.7 $37.5 n.a.
Net Benefits $19.9 $28.2 n.a. -$2.0 n.a. -$14.8$8.6 n.a.
a.Aggregate totals may not add due to rounding.
b.  The EPA is the primary agency responsible for implementing the following environmental statutes: CAA=Clean Air Act;
CERCLA=Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; CWA=Clean Water Act; FIFRA=Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; RCRA=Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; SDWA=Safe Drinking Water Act; TSCA=Toxic
Substances Control Act
c.Net benefits are calculated by subtracting net costs from benefits.38. The estimates of benefits and costs in the RIAs of proposed rules are not as robust as the estimates for final rules
because agencies often significantly change their estimates between the proposed and final stages of the rulemaking
process, in response to OMB comments and for other unknown reasons. Agencies also never finalize  some proposed
rules. In addition, the year of implementation for proposed rules is unknown, which makes the timing of the benefits
and costs difficult to estimate. I therefore attach more significance to the results of my analysis of the final rules,
although analysis of the proposed rules reveals some interesting patterns.
39. HHS rules show positive net benefits, however, when nonstandardized, monetized  benefits are included. HHS net
benefits are negative because of Health Care Financing Administration rules with negative net benefits. The net
benefits of Food and Drug Administration  rules are positive. 
40. For proposed rules, all agencies except the DOT have positive net benefits if I include nonstandardized, monetized
benefits.
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rules, and the second part summarizes the results for proposed rules.
38  In each section of the table,
I list the number of regulations for which either cost or benefit and cost information was available,
specify whether the rule passes a benefit-cost test, and provide aggregate information on benefits and
costs. It is clear from the table that although total net benefits of regulation are positive, net benefits
vary dramatically by agency.
Table 4 shows that aggregate net benefits are positive for final rules from each agency with
the exception of the HHS.
39  This is not true for proposed rules, as only the Department of Labor
(DOL), EPA, and HHS have positive aggregate benefits.
40  The analysis indicates that safety
regulations, which reduce the risk of car, fire, or workplace accidents, have higher net benefits than
other regulations. DOL safety regulations, for example, have higher net benefits than DOL health
regulations, both for final and proposed rules. In addition, the net benefits of Department of
Transportation regulations, designed primarily to increase motor vehicle safety, far exceed the net
benefits of other agencies. The net benefits of DOT regulations account for over half of the total net
benefits from regulation, even though these net benefits result from less than 10% of all regulations
used to calculate net benefits. 
The net benefits of EPA regulations account for approximately one-third of the total net
benefits, yet the EPA promulgated 67% of the regulations in the database. In addition, EPA’s net
benefits are positive only because of 19 Clean Air Act rules with high net benefits. All EPA rules
promulgated under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), and the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) have negative net benefits. Since TSCA
and FIFRA are regarded as “balancing” statutes, meaning that they contain statutory language that41. The two FIFRA regulations are a 1992 rule setting worker protection standards for agricultural pesticides and a
1982 rule outlining data requirements for pesticide registration. The four TSCA regulations are a 1989 rule pertaining
to the manufacture, importation, processing, and distribution of asbestos, a 1987 rule pertaining to materials that
contain asbestos in schools, a 1985 rule pertaining to the manufacture, processing, and distribution of polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs), and a 1983 rule outlining premanufacture notification and review procedures.
42. The figure uses a modified logarithmic scale. The logarithm of net benefits is on the top half of the figure for all
rules that have positive net benefits. The logarithm of net costs is on the bottom half of the figure for all rules that have
positive net costs. 
43. Hahn (1996).
44. Thirty rules with net costs did not clearly quantify any benefits that I monetized for my calculations.
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require agencies to balance the costs and benefits of regulations, it is remarkable that all EPA rules
authorized by these statutes have negative net benefits. A closer look at the two FIFRA rules and the
four TSCA rules reveals that the EPA either identified benefits for these regulations and did not
quantify the benefits, or simply did not identify any benefits.
41  Table 5 shows that five of seven
statutes have regulations that result in net costs. Only regulations based on the Clean Air Act (CAA)
and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) yield positive net benefits. In the case of the SDWA, one
regulation addressing lead and copper accounts for over 95 percent of the benefits of all SDWA
regulations. Without one rule that substantially reduces lead content in gasoline, net benefits for the
CAA drop from about $590 billion to just over $200 billion. Proposed regulations show a similar
pattern with a wide range of net benefits for regulations. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the distribution of net benefits of final rules over time.
42  The
results reveal two interesting patterns also found in my earlier study.
43  First, I find no distinct time
trend for benefits and costs. Second, most rules with net benefits tend to range from $10 billion to
less than $100 billion. In contrast, most rules with net costs range from $0 to $10 billion.
44  While less
than half of all final rules pass a benefit-cost test, aggregate net benefits are positive because many
of the rules that do pass have substantial benefits. For example, just two rules–the DOT’s automatic
restraints in cars and the EPA’s lead phasedown in gasoline--account for just over 70 percent of total
net benefits of regulation.
I examine the impact of varying key parameters on the benefits and costs of individual
regulations because I made a number of critical assumptions to standardize the data. Table 6 shows
the impact of varying the discount rate and the value of benefits for final rules. A reduction in the
value of benefits from the base-case scenario to the “low” scenario reduces net benefits by $941







































a. The figure uses a modified logarithmic scale. The logarithm of net benefits is on the top half of the figure for all rules that have positive 
net benefits. The logarithm of net costs is on the bottom half of the figure for all rules that have positive net costs. 











10 BillionTable 6:  Sensitivity Analysis of the Net Benefits of Final Rules
a
Discount Rate
Value of Benefits 3% 5% 7%
Low Values $590 $612 $593
Base Values $1,580 $1,553 $1,477
High Values $2,806 $2,699 $2,541
a.  All estimates are in billions of 1995 dollars. The number of rules that pass a benefit-cost test is given
in parentheses.45. In general, as the discount rate increases, future costs and benefits are valued less. If benefits occur farther in the
future than costs, which is generally the case, net benefits should also decrease. The opposite should hold true when
the discount rate is decreased. In this calculation, however, certain components of health benefits actually increase in
value with higher discount rates. This means that the net benefits of a rule can increase or decrease with changes in
the discount rate, which is what I observe here. 
46. The exceptions are 1982, 1983, 1986, 1987, and 1996. But the values are much smaller than the positive values
of other years.
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billion. Variations in the discount rate have a less pronounced impact. Decreasing the discount rate
from 5 percent to 3 percent increases net benefits by $27 billion, while increasing the discount rate
from 5 percent to 7 percent decreases net benefits by $56 billion.
45  
Varying the base year for the present value calculation has a significant effect on the
magnitude of the estimates. It was necessary to choose a base year to standardize the data, but the
choice was difficult because the benefits and costs of regulations accrue over different periods of time
from 1981 onwards, and therefore have different base years. The choice of an earlier base year than
1996, the year that I chose for this analysis, lowers the net benefits of regulations because the value
of benefits in the future decreases for regulations promulgated later. If I use a different base year, all
net benefits would change by a factor of (1 + r)
t, where r is the discount rate and t is the difference
between the new and the original base year. For example, using a 5 percent discount rate and 1980
as a base year instead of 1996, the analysis would yield the present value of net benefits at roughly
half the original estimate. Similarly, using 2010 as the base year would nearly double the present value
estimate. This analysis suggests that the aggregate benefit numbers need to be treated with great care
because there is no obvious choice for a base year. I chose 1996 for the base case because that was
the “present” for my analysis. I could just as easily have chosen 1980 or 1981, however, in which case
I would have obtained a substantially lower estimate.
In addition, the choice of a base year greatly affects how net benefits vary with changes in the
discount rate. Figure 2 shows the net benefits as a function of the discount rate for base years 1980,
1996, and 2010. Table 6 shows how total net benefits vary with changes in the discount rate. For the
1980 case, all parts of the benefit-cost stream are discounted backward because all rules are
implemented after 1980. In addition, as Figure 1 shows, the aggregate net present value of benefits
from regulations implemented in any given year is positive for most years.
46  Therefore, I observe aFigure 2:  Aggregate Net Benefits of Final Regulations as a Function of the 
Discount Rate























































Base Year 201047. The intuition can be drawn by evaluating a set of positive cash flows over time, say from 1980–2010. First, take
the present value of that stream (analogous to a base year of 1980). As the discount rate increases, the present value
goes down because each component of the benefit stream decreases in value. Next, consider a future value of that
stream in 2010 (analogous to a base year of 2010). By the same logic, each component increases with an increase in
the discount rate. Finally, a base year in between 1980 and 2010 increases some early values in the stream and reduces
the later values. I cannot know the result of varying the discount rate without making further assumptions about the
nature of the benefit stream.
48. For the 1996 base year, net benefits actually increase by a small amount as the discount rate increases when it is
low.
49. Another measure, frequently used in environmental regulation, is the cost per ton of pollutant reduction. This
measure is typically used for Clean Air Act regulations. I use the cost per life saved measure because it applies to a
broader class of regulations in the database. Neither measure includes some of the benefits from ecosystem protection
that agencies cannot easily quantify.
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decline in net present value as the discount rate increases.
47  In contrast, for the 2010 case, most parts
of the benefit-cost stream would be discounted forward, so I observe an increase in net benefits as
the discount rate increases. For 1996, the base year used in the calculations of this paper, some parts
of the benefit-cost stream are discounted forward while others are discounted backward. The net
effect is that net benefits do not change much with changes in the discount rate.
48  Varying values for
other parameters, such as average age of death, latency periods, and derivation of the fatality index,
generally has a less pronounced effect on the results.
Why Some Regulations are More Efficient than Other Regulations
A regulation’s benefit-cost ratio or its estimated cost-effectiveness are measures of its
efficiency. If society is spending its regulatory resources efficiently, it is maximizing the net benefits
of regulation. While cost-effectiveness estimates and benefit-cost ratios are not better measures of
efficiency than net benefits estimates, they allow the comparison of regulations if the information
about regulatory costs and benefits is insufficient to estimate net benefits. In environmental, health,
and safety regulation, a common definition of cost-effectiveness is the resources used for each
statistical life saved by the regulation.
49  A benefit-cost ratio is the sum of the benefits and cost savings
from a regulation divided by the costs of the regulation. In this section, I use cost-effectiveness
estimates and benefit-cost ratios primarily to examine factors that could explain the variation in
regulatory efficiency.50. President Carter created the OIRA with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, but the Act was not implemented
until the end of 1980. For the purpose of the analysis, I therefore assumed that OIRA was created January 1, 1981.
Before Reagan introduced the RIA requirement in 1981, data on the benefits and costs of regulations were sparse. As
a result, the Hahn-Morrall dataset contains estimates for only 10 rules from the period 1967 to 1980, while there are
estimates for 71 rules from 1981 to 1995.
51. To calculate the cost-effectiveness of regulations, I use a methodology similar to that of Morrall, Tengs and
Graham, and Tengs et al. See Morrall (1986), Tengs and Graham (1996), and Tengs et al. (1994). I define costs as
direct, or gross, costs. I define effectiveness in terms of  “adjusted” lives and life-years. Lives and life-years are adjusted
to account for significant nonfatal diseases and injuries by using the fatality index discussed in my earlier work. I
compute cost-effectiveness by dividing the annualized cost by the annualized lives or life-years saved as a result of the
regulation. I use “life-years” instead of “lives” because life-years better account for the effect of a premature death or
variation in the number of years an individual must live with the consequences of a nonfatal injury or disease. For
example, the use of life-years accounts for the fact that a child has more years of life remaining than an elderly person.
The discount rate for the base case is 5 percent.
52. As with the calculation of the net benefits discussed earlier in the paper, modification of key parameters can
significantly impact cost-effectiveness estimates and therefore the results of the analysis. My cost-effectiveness
estimates do not appear sensitive to changes in key parameters. Changes in the parameters did not result in differences
greater than an order of magnitude. The sensitivity analysis also did not modify the relative ranking of rules based on
the cost-effectiveness estimates.
53. I base this estimate on data from 1993. The Gross National Product estimate is from the Council of Economic
Advisers (1997), and I adjusted it to 1995 dollars. The number of deaths from both cancer and accidents are from the
U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (1995). I assume that 2 percent of cancer deaths are induced by
environmental causes (Ames and Gold, 1996).
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Cost-Effectiveness Estimates as a Measure of Regulatory Efficiency
The regression analysis based on cost-effectiveness estimates shows that: 1) regulations that
address cancer risks are generally less cost-effective than other regulations; 2) cancer regulations
promulgated by the EPA appear less cost-effective than other cancer regulations; 3) it is difficult to
measure whether the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has increased the
efficiency of the regulatory process
50 ; and 4) the cost-effectiveness of regulations does not vary
systematically over time.
51  Figure 3 graphs the logarithm of the cost-effectiveness of each regulation,
identified by the year of promulgation, against time.
52  Figure 3 shows that the cost-effectiveness of
regulation exhibits a wide variation over time, within agencies and across agencies. Cost-effectiveness
estimates range from $60,000 to $38 billion per life saved, with a median value of about $6 million
per life saved. To put the cost-effectiveness estimates in perspective, if the government spent the
entire Gross National Product (GNP) on reducing accidental deaths and environmentally induced
cancers, the maximum the government could spend per life saved is $68 million.
53  If I applied thatFigure 3: Cost-effectiveness of Selected Final 
Environmental, 































































































fifty-2654. Seven of the rules that would not pass are regulations from the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
55 . See, for example, Goklany (1992), Morrall (1986), Tengs and Graham (1996), and Hahn (1996).
56. The benefit-cost ratio regression is discussed further in the next section. 
57. I evaluated 52 final regulations, and Morrall evaluated 29 final regulations. Before pooling these regulations, I
tested for structural stability between the Hahn data and the Morrall data by applying the Chow test. I could not reject
the null hypothesis that the two regressions are the same. Hence, pooling of the data is reasonable. The regulations
represent only a fraction of the regulations evaluated by Hahn and Morrall, who respectively evaluated 144 and 47 final
regulations. The regulations used in the regression are the only ones for which it was possible to calculate cost-
effectiveness, however. The agency did not estimate benefits for a large number of the regulations, for example, which
made the calculation of cost-effectiveness impossible. Eighteen regulations overlapped between Hahn’s database and
Morrall’s database. For the Hahn-Morrall pooled regression, I used the Hahn estimates for the overlapping regulations.
Of the overlapping eighteen regulations, four of the cost-effectiveness estimates differed by more that an order of
magnitude. I believe that this difference is the result of Morrall’s adjustments to the agency’s numbers, since I took
the agency’s numbers as given. Morrall adjusted the agency numbers on the basis of a detailed analysis of specific rules
to correct agency errors (Morrall, 1986).  I ran a regression with Morrall’s estimates for the overlapping regulations,
and the results of the regression did not change. My cost-effectiveness analysis has an advantage over Morrall’s
analysis because  a third party can more easily reproduce it.
58. I initially used the value for cost-effectiveness, but none of the results were significant.  The logarithmic function
narrows the range on cost-effectiveness and provided a better fit to the data. 
59. The Hahn-Morrall Pooled regression uses cost per life saved because the cost per life-year saved data are not
available for the Morrall estimates.
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two—would fail. For the EPA, one-half—twelve of twenty-four—would fail the test.
54  In other
words, for a significant number of regulations, the government would exhaust the GNP simply by
investing in regulations aimed at reducing a small portion of the cancer risk faced by society. Such
imprudent investments leave no money for the basic necessities of life. The high cost-effectiveness
estimates and the variability in cost-effectiveness across regulations and agencies suggest that there
is significant potential for achieving much greater risk reduction at a lower cost to society, a point
made by several authors.
55
Table 7 summarizes three cost-effectiveness regressions and one benefit-cost ratio
regression.
56  One of the cost-effectiveness regressions is based on the data assembled for this study,
and the other two combine data from the study with data from earlier studies by Morrall.
57  The
dependent variable in all regressions is the natural logarithm of the cost-effectiveness of regulation.
58
For the Hahn regression, I used the natural logarithm of the cost per life-year saved and for the Hahn-
Morrall pooled regression I used the natural logarithm of the cost per life saved.
59  I also used slightly
different estimates for the cancer variable in the Hahn regression. The Hahn-Morrall OIRA regression




2 Constant   Year Cancer EPA-Cancer OIRA
Hahn 52 0.662 -181.72 0.089 (.9) 3.62* (4.1) 2.17* (2.5)
Hahn-Morrall 81 0.643 -91.1 0.05 (1.3) 3.76* (6.21) 1.06* (1.7)
Hahn-Morrall/OIRA 81 0.652 -215.60.11* (1.9) 3.67* (6.1) 1.21* (1.9) 1.38 (1.4)
Benefit-Cost Ratio
c n R
2 Constant Year Health EPA-Health
Hahn 105 0.172 -277.0 0.14 (1.5)-3.19* (-2.7) -0.36 (-.4)
a. All regressions use only final rules. All variables with a t-statistic that is significant at the 10 percent level using a two-tailed test are marked with a (*). T-
statistics are shown in parentheses.
b. The dependent variable in the Hahn cost-effectiveness regression is the natural logarithm of the cost per adjusted life-year saved. The dependent variable in
the Hahn and Morrall pooled cost-effectiveness regression is the cost per life saved. Life-years and lives are adjusted based on a fatality index created by
Viscusi (1992). See description in text for more information. 
c. The dependent variable in the Hahn benefit-cost ratio regression is the natural logarithm of the adjusted benefit-cost ratio. The benefit-cost ratio is defined
as the sum of benefits and cost savings divided by gross costs. The benefits include life-years and lives saved, which are adjusted based on a fatality index
created by Viscusi (1992). See description in text for more information. The logarithm is adjusted by a small constant to include zero values.    29
Hahn-Morrall pooled regression. I used only final regulations for all regressions.
60
 I tested 
the following hypotheses: 1) cancer regulations are less cost-effective than other 
regulations; 2) cancer regulations promulgated by the EPA are less cost-effective than 
other cancer regulations; 3) regulations promulgated before the creation of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs are less cost-effective than other regulations;
61
 and 4) 
regulations have decreased in cost-effectiveness over time, as measured by the date the 
agency published the rule in the Federal Register.
62
 
I expected a regulation designed to reduce the risk of cancer would be less cost-
effective than other regulations because agencies appear to regulate cancer risks more 
stringently than noncancer risks. Agencies may, for example, regulate cancer risks more 
stringently because of public “dread” of cancer risks, which may translate into political 
support for cancer regulations.
63
  The median cancer regulation is over seventy times as 
costly per life saved as the median noncancer regulation.
64
  On the basis of a review of the 
data and research of other economists, I also expected that cancer regulations 
promulgated by the EPA are less cost-effective than other cancer regulations. Figure 3,   
                                                         
60  Since this analysis contains only final rules, there are 13 fewer observations than the Hahn-Morrall 
pooled regression in Hahn (1996) because that regression included proposed and rejected rules. I decided to 
use only final rules because the agency’s estimates of the benefits and costs may change significantly 
between proposed and final rules, and because agencies may never finalize some proposed rules. The 
agency did not take final action on eleven of the proposed rules I reviewed, for example. A general 
examination of these rules suggests that as the cost -effectiveness of a rule increases, it is less likely an 
agency will take final action on that rule. The basis for an agency’s decision not to take final action is often 
unclear, however, and it is possible that poor cost-effectiveness is not the primary reason. I am hesitant to 
attribute such agency decisions to enlightened agency behavior or effective OIRA oversight as Viscusi 
(1996) suggests. The EPA, for example, withdrew a 1992 proposed rule to revise a program related to 
enhanced monitoring requirements for vehicles although the rule was relatively cost-effective. It is possible 
that other factors influence an agency’s decision not to take action, but identification of these factors was 
beyond the scope of my study. Moreover, the number of no-action rules I examined is small and comprises 
primarily a series of EPA rules to reduce health risk from benzene in 1989 and 1990. It is difficult to draw 
defensible conclusions from such a small sample. To test the influence of proposed rules, I included 
proposed rules for which agencies provided estimates in the Hahn and the Hahn-Morrall pooled 
regressions. The explanatory power of the model decreased as a result of including proposed rules. I also 
included a dummy variable for proposed rules in both regressions. The dummy variable was not significant 
in either model. 
61  President Carter established the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the OMB with the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980. The original purpose of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations, including review of 
proposed regulations and changes in agency procedures. President Reagan and President Clinton eventually 
expanded the review responsibilities of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to include review 
of regulatory impact analyses of proposed and draft final rules. 
62  Morrall’s data includes some minor rules as well as some regulations before the development of formal 
RIAs, while the Hahn data includes only “major” regulations and “economically significant” regulations, as 
defined by Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 and Clinton’s Executive Order 12866. 
63  Public perception of risk and its influence on agency priorities has been extensively discussed in the 
literature. See, for example, Slovak et al. (1985), Viscusi and Magat (1987), and Sunstein (1996). 
64  Noncancer regulations in the database primarily are regulations pertaining to health risk resulting from 
lead poisoning and poor nutrition. These regulations are widely regarded as relatively cost-effective 
compared to other regulations. 65. This finding excludes one HUD safety rule addressing improved wind standards for manufactured housing. The
cost-effectiveness of the rule is approximately one-fourth that of the median EPA regulation. Although that rule ranks
poorly in terms of its cost-effectiveness, it actually results in net cost savings when the agency considers extensive
property damage losses. Therefore, I do not include the rule in that comparison.
66.  Out of 33 total EPA regulations in the database, 29 are cancer regulations. Forty out of the 81 total regulations
in the database are cancer regulations. 
67. A coefficient is “marginally significant” if it is significant at the 10 percent level by using a two-tailed t-test,
“significant” if it is significant at the 5 percent level, and “highly significant” if it is significant at the 1 percent level.
68. The interpretation of this and other regression coefficients is based on the conversion of the coefficients from the
natural logarithm. The range is based on a calculation of a 95% confidence interval.
69. To measure whether EPA cancer regulations are less cost-effective than other cancer regulations, I included an
interaction variable for EPA and Cancer in the original regression. The EPA-Cancer variable and the Cancer variable
are highly correlated (correlation coefficient  = .75), however, so I expected some instability in the model. I was
somewhat surprised that the EPA-Cancer variable was marginally significant in the Hahn-Morrall pooled regression.
The EPA-Cancer variable was highly significant in a regression that did not include the Cancer variable, however.
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suggests that EPA regulations in general are relatively poor in terms of cost-effectiveness compared
with the regulations of other agencies. The median final EPA regulation costs about $120 million per
life saved, more than eight times higher than the median for DOL health regulations and more than
eighty times higher than the median for all other agencies.
65  It is not clear from Figure 3, however,
whether EPA regulations are less cost-effective because they  are EPA regulations, or because they
are cancer regulations.
66  I further expected that regulations promulgated before the creation of the
OIRA are less cost-effective than regulations promulgated after the creation of OIRA because of the
positive impact of OIRA review of draft regulations. I only tested this variable in the Hahn-Morrall
pooled regression because my original dataset does not contain any regulations prior to the creation
of OIRA. Finally, I presumed that cost-effectiveness declines over time as agencies use the low-cost
options for saving lives first, although new scientific information about risk or the introduction of new
technologies to reduce risk could reverse this effect.  
The results of the Hahn regression and the two regressions based on the Hahn-Morrall pooled
data are similar. Cancer is the only variable that is highly significant in all three regressions.
67  The
magnitude of the difference in cost-effectiveness between cancer regulations and other social
regulations is somewhat surprising. My analysis suggests that cancer regulations are approximately
42 times less cost-effective than other regulations. Cancer regulations could be as little as five time
less cost-effective or as great as 142 times less cost-effective than other social regulations.
68   There
is some evidence that EPA cancer regulations are less cost-effective than other cancer regulations,
but it is not convincing because the coefficient is only marginally significant.
69  The results from theIn addition, the EPA-Cancer variable was statistically significant in the Hahn regression. The standard errors of both
the EPA-Cancer variable and the Cancer variable in both the Hahn and the Hahn-Morrall pooled regression increase
relative to regressions in which only one of the variables is included, which is probably a result of the collinearity. 
70. Again, the range is calculated based on a 95% confidence interval.
71. In addition, the data may be biased. The dataset could include, for example, EPA regulations that are among the
most cost-effective of all EPA rules because the EPA did not quantify the costs and benefits of less cost-effective rules.
Alternatively, some EPA rules that are very cost-effective may not be in the database because the EPA promulgated
them before Reagan’s Executive Order required agencies to submit information on the costs and benefits of regulations.
72. The results of the regression on Morrall’s complete data set, described in Hahn (1996), are similar to the results
of the Hahn and the Hahn-Morrall Pooled regressions. The cancer variable is significant and the EPA variable is
insignificant in the 1996 Morrall regression, although the year variable is significant.
73. I present the regression with the OIRA variable only to stimulate discussion about how to quantitatively measure
its impact. The OIRA variable and the Year variable are highly correlated  (correlation coefficient = -.77), and as a
result the model is unstable. As a result of this instability, I believe, the year variable in this model is significant. 
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Hahn-Morrall pooled regression show that cancer regulations are approximately twice as cost-
effective as EPA cancer regulations, although the EPA cancer regulations could be slightly more cost-
effective than other cancer regulations or as much as nine times less cost-effective.
70  More research
is necessary to determine whether EPA cancer regulations are more or less cost-effective than other
cancer regulations.
71
Contrary to my expectations, the OIRA variable is not significant.
72  The lack of evidence of
OIRA’s impact on the process appears to result from of a lack of observations prior to the creation
of OIRA and the difficulty of finding an appropriate measure of OIRA’s impact. It is unclear why
OIRA review does not significantly affect cost-effectiveness estimates, although it is probably a
function of the lack of adequate data prior to the creation of OIRA.
73  Only 10 rules in the Hahn-
Morrall data set were promulgated before the creation of OIRA. Alternatively, it is possible that the
data mask the impact of OIRA because agencies simply did not propose or finalize rules for several
years after the creation of OIRA. For example, there were no cost-effectiveness estimates for
regulations in the Hahn-Morrall pooled dataset for 1981 and 1982, the first two years after the
creation of OIRA. Another possibility is that it is difficult to measure the impact of OIRA from
information on the benefits and costs of final rules. The impact of OIRA may, for example, be
integrally tied to the actions of high-level political officials related to delaying, modifying and rejecting
rules. These actions are not easily observed. It is also difficult to measure how the cost-effectiveness
of a regulation might have changed as a result of suggestions made by OIRA to the agencies. Further
analysis is therefore necessary to determine the extent to which OIRA has had an impact on the cost-74. The OIRA variable was not significant in any specification of the model presented in this paper, including a model
in which the only independent variables were the cancer variable and the OIRA variable. I also tried to capture the
impact of the regulatory impact analysis requirement in Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 and Clinton’s Executive
Order 12866. I created dummy variables for each of these orders. According to my results, neither order significantly
affected cost-effectiveness estimates. This result is probably also related to the lack of observations prior to 1981,
however. 
75. The pattern over time appears to be driven in part by the type of rules promulgated in a particular year. Specific
agencies often prepare analyses with similar characteristics. All National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rules,
for example, estimated health benefits but did not monetize those benefits, while all HHS rules estimated and
monetized benefits and passed a benefit-cost test.
76. I also tested whether the the political affiliation of the administration affected cost-effectiveness estimates, but there
is no significant relationship. This result may be a function of the definition of the variable. Many rules developed
under one administration are promulgated under a subsequent one, but I used the year of promulgation to determine
to link each regulation with a particular administration. The Clinton administration, for example, promulgated many
of the rules associated with the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments Congress passed during the Bush administration.
I further tested the hypothesis that rules promulgated during election years are less cost-effective than other regulations,
as believed by many diligent observers of the regulatory process, but my results indicate that the election year also does
not significantly affect cost-effectiveness. Again, this result may be a consequence of the limitations of the data. More
work must be done to determine whether these variables impact regulatory efficiency.  




The evidence that the year of promulgation does not influence cost-effectiveness is strong,
and the result is consistent with Figure 3. Figure 3 shows that the cost-effectiveness of regulations
as a function of time does not follow any obvious pattern.
75  The result could arise for several reasons.
New hazards continuously emerge, for example, that may result in relatively cost-effective regulation.
In addition, differences in the priorities of different administrations could affect cost-effectiveness
estimates.
76  Another possible explanation is simply that concerns with cost-effectiveness rarely drive
agencies’ agendas. Instead, they are driven by laws that Congress passes as well as crises that spring
up from time to time. I have found some evidence that agencies do not set priorities on the basis of
relative risks or cost-effectiveness. For example, the EPA only recently began seriously examining
the relative rankings of risks.
77  Even to this day, the agency has done very little work on prioritizing
regulations in terms of cost-effectiveness. The same is true of most other agencies. Another possible
explanation is that social regulation already reached the point of diminishing returns by the early
1980s. Congress passed most of the major environmental statutes, such as the most comprehensive
versions of the Clean Water Act and the Clear Air Act, in the early 1970s. A time series dating back
to the early 1970s might therefore show a time trend. Finally it is possible that technological
improvement lowers the cost of meeting some regulatory objectives. 78. I only included air pollution reduction benefits because the agencies did not generally quantify any benefits from
pollution reduction other than from air pollution reduction. According to the EPA, these benefits are large and may
therefore significantly affect the results of the regression. Pollution reduction benefits can change the cost-effectiveness
estimates by orders of magnitude and in some cases can even change the sign of the estimates. See Hahn (1996, 229)
for details. The benefit-cost ratios of regulations with air pollution benefits are affected by my general valuation of air
pollution reduction benefits, however, discussed earlier in this paper. These benefits are subject to a great deal of
uncertainty because of our incomplete understanding of the science and the difficulty of measuring society’s willingness
to pay for improvements in air quality.  Moreover, the willingness-to-pay estimates could vary dramatically depending
on the level of pollution and the location.
79. I have fifty-two final rules with data on cost-effectiveness and net benefits. A comparison  of the natural logarithms
of the standard measures of cost-effectiveness and the benefit-cost ratio revealed a correlation of !.80 when costs
savings are included in the measurement of the benefit-cost ratio and !.96 when cost savings are excluded. This
suggests that the measures result in a relatively similar ranking of rules for that particular case.
80. The benefit-cost ratio regression contains the same 52 regulations for which Hahn-Siskin estimates of
cost–effectiveness are also available. It further contains an additional 53 regulations, 32 of which have no quantified
benefits, and 21 of which have quantified benefits only from air pollution. I ran a regression using only the 52
regulations that were also used in the Hahn cost-effectiveness regression, and the results of my benefit-cost ratio
regression did not change. The R-squared of the benefit-cost ratio regression with only 52 regulations increased from
.17 to .31 relative to the regression with 105 regulations, however.
81. I transformed the logarithmic function by adding a small constant (.001) to include rules with no benefits or cost
savings. Changing the size of the constant did not significantly affect my results. 
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Benefit-Cost Ratios as a Measure of Regulatory Efficiency
The benefit-cost ratio regression includes regulations with no quantified benefits and
regulations with air pollution reduction benefits that are not included in the cost-effectiveness
estimates, and therefore provide an alternative measure of regulatory efficiency.
78  The results of the
benefit-cost ratio regression, presented in Table 7, support the results of the cost-effectiveness
regressions. Regulations that reduce the risk of cancer, heart disease, and lead poisoning (termed
“health” regulations) have lower benefit-cost ratios than regulations that reduce the risk of car, fire,
or work-related accidents (“safety” regulations). In addition, it appears EPA health regulations have
lower benefit-cost ratios than other health regulations. Finally, the benefit-cost ratios of regulations
do not vary systematically over time. 
A benefit-cost ratio is the sum of benefits and cost savings divided by gross costs.
79  The
benefit-cost ratio database contains 105 regulations, 24 more than the cost-effectiveness regression.
80
The regression is based only on data collected for this study, and does not include regulations from
the Morrall database used for the cost-effectiveness regressions. The benefit-cost ratio regression uses
the natural logarithm of the benefit-cost ratio as the dependent variable.
81  It also uses a health variable82. As a result of the broad range of qualitative health benefits, the specification of many EPA rules into cancer and
noncancer categories is difficult. The health variable includes all cancer regulations, in addition to regulations that
reduce the risk from lead poisoning and heart disease. A few rules do not clearly fit into either the health or the safety
category. Examples include U.S. Coast Guard rules to reduce the frequency and severity of oil spills and USDA rules
that address the treatment and care of animals. I dropped these rules from the regression.
83. Eliminating these regulations from the regression did not change the results.
84. Like the cost-effectiveness regressions, however, the EPA-Health variable and the Health variable are highly
correlated (correlation coefficient  = .71). Out of the 84 health regulations in the database, 69 are EPA health
regulations. Not surprisingly, the EPA-Health variable is highly significant in a regression that excludes the Health
variable. The Health variable is also highly significant in a regression that excludes the EPA-Health variable.  
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instead of the cancer variable used in the cost-effectiveness regressions.
82  Of the 105 regulations in
the database, 84 are health regulations. The regulations span from 1982 to 1996, but 67% of the
regulations are from 1990 to 1996. There are 25 regulations in the database with zero benefits
because the agency did not quantify benefits or cost savings, but did include some estimate of the
costs of the regulation.
83  While most of the benefit-cost ratios for regulations are low (57% of
regulations have a ratio is less than 1), there are eight benefit-cost ratios in the database that range
from 12 to 61. Of these eight regulations, five are safety regulations and three are health regulations.
Similar to the cost-effectiveness regressions, the benefit-cost ratio regression was designed
to test the hypotheses that health regulations are less efficient than other social regulations, that EPA
health regulations are less efficient than other health regulations, and that the benefit-cost ratios of
regulations have decreased over time. The results of the benefit-cost ratio regression are similar to
the cost-effectiveness regressions because the health variable is significant, and the EPA variable and
the year variable are both insignificant. The signs on both the EPA and the health variable are
negative, as expected. The analysis strongly suggests that health regulations have lower benefit-cost
ratios than other regulations, but there is less support for the hypothesis that EPA health regulations
have lower benefit-cost ratios than other regulations because of complications from collinearity.
84
The results of the regressions may be affected by the limitations of the original data. Although
this analysis is more comprehensive than any other analysis to date, the regressions are based on only
a subset of my original database because of the absence of cost and benefit estimates for the majority
of the regulations. In addition, technological advancements and scientific discoveries may reveal that
agencies originally understated the benefits of existing rules. Finally, variation in the assumptions
agencies and program offices use to estimate benefits and costs affect the results of such analytical
exercises. These regressions are therefore primarily designed to provide an initial starting point from85. See, for example, Magat, Krupnick, and Harrington (1986).
86. While the CAA prohibits the EPA from considering costs or welfare benefits when it sets primary national ambient
air quality standards, the agency is required to consider such factors as technical feasibility, affordability, and cost-
effectiveness in setting standards for motor vehicles and new or modified stationary sources.
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which to launch a more thorough investigation of the factors that influence the efficiency of
regulations. 
III. Statutory Restrictions on Regulations and Economic Efficiency
Information on the political forces that affect regulations may explain some variability in
regulatory efficiency. Political forces affect the efficiency of regulations because each statute is the
result of a debate between legislators that reflects the beliefs of individual representatives as well as
the prevailing degree of public support for regulatory reform. The result of the heated and often
partisan debate is a significant amount of variation in the stringency of statutory balancing
requirements, which should determine the degree to which agencies balance the costs and benefits
of regulations. To determine whether balancing requirements affect regulatory outcomes, I first
examined the degree to which statutes allow agencies to consider benefits and costs as they design
regulations.
85  I then compared the net benefits of regulations promulgated under the different statutes.
I find that statutory limitations appear to have little effect on the efficiency of rules.
The statutory language that requires agencies to consider benefits and costs varies
tremendously across and even within statutes, and the language is often ambiguous.
86  Agencies and
courts have determined that some statutes preclude agencies from considering costs. Numerous
environmental, health, and safety statutes, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act and most
parts of the Clean Air Act, restrict the use of benefit-cost analysis in regulatory decisionmaking.
Congress attempted to address widespread concern about statutory restrictions on balancing benefits
and costs with a “supermandate” provision in many of the regulatory reform bills proposed in the
104th Congress. A supermandate provision means that the balancing language in the regulatory
reform bill will supplement and, to the extent they conflict, will supersede requirements of authorizing
statutes. The bill proposed by the 104
th  Congress required agencies to apply a limited benefit-cost test87. See, for example, Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 1022, and
Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1st sess., S. 343. The language in the House version is
stronger.
88. For that categorization, I relied on Environmental Protection Agency (1987a), Fraas (1991), Rhomberg (1997),
and Downing (1995).
89. In International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (1991), the District of Columbia Circuit Court remanded
OSHA’s interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which was restricted only by “feasibility,” and
suggested that benefit-cost analysis was consistent with the language of the act (Office of Technology Assessment
1995). Environmental Protection Agency (1987a) indicates that, while the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
is silent with regard to the appropriate consideration of costs, benefits and costs not related to human health and the
environment should not be considered in rulemaking.
90. Since agencies are required by executive orders to estimate and, to the extent feasible, to quantify the benefits and
costs of all major rules, I would not expect significant differences in the completeness of analyses.
91. On the basis of the rules reviewed in the regulatory scorecard, more than 60 percent of rules clearly falls into that
category while an additional 18 percent of rules arguably would be placed in that category.
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to proposed and final regulations.
87  To examine the possible effect of restrictions on the expected
benefits from regulations, I place statutes into two categories—statutes that allow balancing and
statutes that do not allow or restrict balancing.
88  While the categorization is crude, the methodology
allows a rough comparison of rules resulting from the two types of statutes. The balancing language
in two statutes, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and safety standards under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act does not specify whether the agencies should consider benefits
and costs during the rulemaking process. These agencies have, however, often interpreted the statutes
to limit the consideration of costs.
89  Hence, I consider two scenarios—one that designates the two
statutes as a separate category and one that includes the two statutes in the “Balancing Not
Allowed/Restricted” category. I then use the information from the regulatory scorecard and the net
benefits of regulations to sort the regulations into different categories as shown in Table 8. I
hypothesize that rules from limiting statutes are less economically efficient than rules resulting from
other statutes. Hence, a lower percentage of those rules would pass a benefit-cost test.
90
The analysis leads to the following conclusions. First, the degree to which agencies can
consider benefits and costs varies tremendously and is often dependent on agency interpretation.
Second, most rules are authorized under statutes that allow limited balancing.
91  Many of these rules













c 15 20% 15 47%
II. Balancing Not Allowed/Restricted
d 71 14% 63 37%
III. Unclear 
e 25 32% 19 53%
Subtotal II and III
f 96 19% 82 40%
a. Based on an analysis of all final rules from 1982 through mid-1996. These are the same final rules used in Table 1
and Table 2. 
b. Based on an analysis of final rules from 1982 through mid-1996. These are the same rules used to calculate aggregate
net benefits. The results of the net benefits analysis are separated by agency in Table 4 and Table 5.  
c. Statutes include Oil Pollution Act (DOT), Transportation Safety Act (DOT), Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (EPA), Toxic Substances Control Act (EPA), and Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (HHS). Note that
FIFRA does not limit the balancing of benefits and costs in general rulemaking. The statute does, however, place
such limits in setting registration requirements. The FIFRA rules that apply to registration requirements are therefore
placed in the "Balancing Not Allowed/Restricted" category.
d. Statutes include Occupational Safety and Health Act (DOL), Clean Air Act (EPA), Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (EPA), Clean Water Act (EPA), Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (EPA), and Safe Drinking Water Act (EPA).
e. Statutes include Occupational Safety and Health Act (DOL) and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (EPA).
f. The subtotal represents all statutes that could arguably be placed in the "Balancing Not Allowed/Restricted" category.92. That result is probably driven by the fact that rules from statutes without limitations more frequently monetized
benefits (48 percent versus 22 percent). The comparison is 48 percent versus 18 percent when OSHA-safety and
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act rules are included in the “with limitations” category.
93. None of the rules authorized by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances
Control Act—the two statutes that allow benefit-cost balancing—pass a benefit-cost test. Almost 18 percent of other
EPA rules pass a benefit-cost test according to agency calculations.
94. The comparison  is 50 percent versus 42 percent when OSHA-safety and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
rules are included in the "with limitations" category. In addition, when nonstandardized yet monetized  benefits are
included in the base case, the comparison is 59 percent versus 38 percent.
95. Provisions under the executive orders and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 require agencies to choose
the least burdensome alternative to a regulation, or describe in the rule making record  why the agency did not select
the least burdensome alternative. Agencies are not required to quantify the efficiency losses from not choosing the least
burdensome alternative, however. In addition, sometimes choose the least burdensome alternative from a pre-defined
set of alternatives that exclude potentially efficiency enhancing approaches to regulation.
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tremendously, rules from statutes without limitations on balancing pass a benefit-cost test according
to agency analyses more frequently than do rules from statutes with limitations (48 percent versus 15
percent).
92  Such a pattern does not hold within the EPA.
93  Fourth, a clear pattern does not emerge
when I examine the frequency that rules pass a benefit-cost test according to my calculations (50 
percent versus 38 percent).
94  The analysis of the frequency of rules that pass a benefit-cost test in
different categories is quite sensitive to the valuation of health and welfare benefits. The percentage
of Clean Air Act rules that pass a benefit-cost test, for example, drops from 54 percent to 20 percent
when I use the low valuation of pollution benefits.
Although this preliminary analysis suggests that statutory limitations appear to have little
effect on the efficiency of rules, the results must be interpreted with care. My analysis uses very crude
measures for the degree to which statutes constrain agencies. Moreover, isolating the impact of any
single factor in the complex regulatory process is difficult, as the statistical analysis in the previous
section shows. Finally, my analysis does not attempt to measure the efficiency gains associated with
alternatives the agencies did not select or consider as a result of the restrictions.
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IV. The Influence of Regulatory Impact Analyses on the Regulatory Process
Scholars have undertaken less work to determine the impact of RIAs on the regulatory
process than to identify analytical flaws in analyses. Since the impact of RIAs is difficult to measure,
the literature has only provided anecdotal evidence of impacts on the process. In a few cases, for96. RIAs tend to have a greater impact on the process if they contain relatively complete estimates of benefits and costs,
and if agencies use the RIA information in the early stages of the rulemaking process. For example, scholars frequently
refer to an EPA rule to reduce lead in gasoline as an RIA that influenced the agency’s decision because it was thorough
and well-prepared. See, for example, Fraas (1991). For a good study of several RIAs, see also Morgenstern (1997). 
97. My analysis of the benefits and costs of regulations is based not only the government’s numbers, but also on my
assumptions concerning a discount rate and valuation of benefits. Since agencies used a variety of assumptions to
estimate costs and benefits, it was necessary to use a consistent discount rate and the values for benefits to compare
regulations and aggregate net benefits. 
98. Five rules out of the forty-four rules that pass a benefit-cost test with monetized  benefits pass a benefit-cost test on
the basis of net cost savings or monetized  benefits. An additional three rules pass a benefit-cost test if I use the more
favorable range of agency’s calculations to estimate benefits and costs.
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example, RIAs have had a substantial impact and led to more efficient rulemaking.
96  In other cases,
RIAs did not aid the rulemaking process, or agencies just used the RIAs to help justify political
decisions. Furthermore, agencies often could not use the RIAs because some statutes preclude the
balancing of benefits and costs or the consideration of costs. To address the gap in the academic
literature, I applied a benefit-cost test to the regulations in my database. The purpose of the test is
to determine whether agencies appear to use information on the relationship between benefits and
costs to make regulatory decisions. I expected that a high percentage of the regulations would pass
a benefit-cost test if agencies consistently use the RIA information to make decisions. I found,
however, that the majority of regulations do not pass a benefit-cost test. I also surveyed agency
officials to get a sense of the internal view of the impact of economic analysis on the regulatory
process. My preliminary research suggests that economic analysis does not have a significant impact
on the regulatory process, although more research is necessary to fully evaluate the impact. 
For the purpose of this analysis, a rule passes a benefit-cost test if the quantified monetary
benefits exceed quantified costs. Table 9 shows the fraction of regulations that agencies stated would
pass a benefit-cost test, and that I found would pass a benefit-cost test after I standardized the
agency’s numbers.
97  I found that agencies stated that a rule passes a benefit-cost test for 23 percent
of all rules—39 of 168. Agencies did not monetize benefits for many of these rules, however. Nine
rules pass a benefit-cost test without monetizing benefits because of net cost savings. Of the rules for
which the agency monetized benefits, 75 percent—30 of 44—pass a benefit-cost test.
98  Of the twenty-
six EPA rules that monetize benefits, fifteen pass the benefit-cost test. An additional four rules pass
the test without monetizing benefits because of significant cost savings. 






DOT EPA HHS HUD USDA
ALL RULES
b 168 1 15 13 13 115 5 2 4
Agency Found Benefits Exceed Costs 23% 100% 7% 38% 31% 17% 100% 100% 50%
FINAL RULES
c 106 1 9 10 9 70 3 1 3
Monetized Benefits Exceed Costs 43% 100% 33% 100% 78% 31% 33% 100% 33%
PROPOSED RULES 30 n.a. 3 1 3 19 2 1 1
Monetized Benefits Exceed Costs 43% n.a. 33% 100% 33% 42% 100% 0% 0%
TOTAL CAA CERCLA CWA FIFRA RCRA SDWA TSCA
ALL EPA RULES
d 115 62 5 14 2 19 8 5
Agency Found Benefits Exceed Costs 17% 16% 0% 21% 0% 16% 25% 20%
FINAL EPA RULES
e 70 35 5 8 2 11 5 4
Monetized Benefits Exceed Costs 31% 54% 0% 0% 0% 18% 20% 0%
PROPOSED EPA RULES 19 10 n.a. 4 n.a. 2 3 n.a.
Monetized Benefits Exceed Costs 42% 60% n.a. 25% n.a. 0% 33% n.a.
a. The following acronyms are used in the table: CPSC=Consumer Product Safety Commission; DOL=Department of Labor; DOT=Department of
Transportation; EPA=Environmental Protection Agency; HHS=Department of Health and Human Services; HUD=Department of Housing and Urban
Development; USDA=United States Department of Agriculture, CAA=Clean Air Act; CERCLA=Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act; CWA=Clean Water Act; FIFRA=Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; RCRA=Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act; SDWA=Safe Drinking Water Act; TSCA=Toxic Substances Control Act.
b. This calculation is based on the universe of rules introduced in Table 1. It includes 121 final rules and 47 proposed rules. The number of rules presented
in the table is the total number of rules in the database. The percentage estimate is the percent of total rules for which the agencies stated the benefits
exceed the costs.
c. The calculation for final rules and proposed rules is based on the universe of rules introduced in Table 4. There are 16 fewer final rules and 17 fewer
proposed rules than are included in the calculation for "All Rules" because I excluded some regulations. See footnote 36 in the text for a description of
excluded rules. 
d. The calculation for all EPA rules is based on the universe of rules introduced in Table 2. It includes 82 final rules and 33
proposed rules.
e. The calculation for final and proposed EPA rules is based on the universe of rules introduced in Table 5. There are 12 fewer final rules and 14 fewer
proposed rules because I excluded some regulations. See footnote 36 in the text for a description of excluded rules.99. In assessing individual regulations, I view the values for pollution reduction used here as very rough
approximations. For example, if many of the proposed emission reductions occur in areas that are already in
compliance with the air quality standards, the values used in the base case probably overstate the benefits. One example
where the benefits are likely to be overstated is for reductions in nitrogen oxide emissions in the Northeast.
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benefits, I standardized the agency estimates and applied the benefit-cost test again. Table 9 shows
that 43 percent of all final rules—46 of 106—pass a benefit-cost test after I standardized the agency
numbers. Table 9 also shows that three of thirty-five final EPA regulations would pass a benefit-cost
test for statutes other than the Clean Air Act. Nineteen of thirty-five final regulations would pass for
the Clean Air Act. In addition, forty-three percent of proposed rules—13 of 30—also pass the test.
Absent my adjustment to the agency’s numbers, 25 percent of proposed rules—12 of 47—and 22
percent of final rules—27 of 121—pass a benefit-cost test. The higher number of rules that pass with
my standardized estimates is largely because I monetize benefits in several cases that the agencies did
not monetize benefits. While all regulations addressing safety risks pass a benefit-cost test, regulations
addressing health and environmental risks pass less frequently. In the case of OSHA, for example,
only three of nine final health regulations would pass a benefit-cost test. In the case of the EPA, only
twenty-two of seventy would pass such a test.
Table 10 shows how the number of rules passing a benefit-cost test varies with assumptions
about the discount rate and the valuation of benefits. The number of rules that pass a benefit-cost test
is most dependent on the value of the benefits. When I use low values at a 5 percent discount rate,
fifteen fewer final rules pass a benefit-cost test than in the base case. This result is predominantly
driven by the values of air pollution reduction, as twelve fewer Clean Air Act rules pass the test.
99
When I use high values at a 5 percent discount rate, four additional rules from the Clean Air Act pass
a benefit-cost test. In other words, changes in the value of a unit of air pollution reduction have a
marked effect on the net benefits of Clean Air Act rules. The analysis also reveals that the number of
rules passing a benefit-cost test does not change dramatically when I vary the discount rate for a given
value of benefits. 
Varying values for other parameters, such as average age of death, latency periods, and
derivation of the fatality index, generally does not have a pronounced effect on the number of rules
that pass a benefit-cost test. The number of rules that pass a benefit-cost test does not change when




Value of Benefits 3% 5% 7%
Low Values 31 31 31
Base Values 45 46 45
High Values 50 50 49
a.  The table shows the number of rules passing a benefit-cost test
under various assumptions about the discount rate and the value of
benefits.A rule passes a benefit-cost test if the benefits of the rule
exceed the costs. The analysis is based on standardized agency
estimates of net benefits. 100. The only exception to that observation is the number of CAA rules that pass a benefit-cost test with changes in
the value of pollutant reduction.
101. Hahn (1996, 223–34).
102. The survey is designed to estimate the impact of future agency actions and to evaluate existing programs.
Regulatory activities covered include major and minor rulemaking as well as other activities, such as licensing,
enforcement, letters of opinion, administrative orders, and exemptions. 
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NHTSA are nonfatal, all of the final rules still have positive net benefits, even when I quantify only
benefits from reduced fatalities. This sensitivity analysis suggests that my estimates of the number of
rules that pass a benefit-cost test are relatively robust.
100
In addition to varying key parameters, there are other factors that the reader should consider
when interpreting my results. To calculate net benefits, I treat a regulation as a single unit of analysis.
Such treatment does not show parts of a regulation that fail a benefit-cost test, or could be improved,
even when the impact of the entire rule is positive. Thus, simply because a regulation has positive net
benefits does not mean that the agency has maximized net benefits or that the agency could not have
improved the regulation. The EPA, for example, could have achieved significantly higher net benefits
had it refined its rule to reduce exposure to copper and lead in drinking water. Similarly, the OSHA
could have refined its rule to limit asbestos to achieve very similar results at a much lower cost.
101
My analysis thusfar implies that agencies do not seriously consider the relationship between
benefits and costs when making regulatory decisions. I cannot fully support this conclusion because
of the degree of uncertainty associated with the estimates of the benefits and costs of regulation,
outlined in the preceding section. Also, measuring the impact of the RIA is difficult because it
requires extensive interviews with agency officials. I performed some sensitivity analysis of my final
tallies because of this uncertainty. The analysis of the information provided in RIAs provides only
summary information about the use of economic analysis in the rulemaking process, and excludes
independent agencies since they are not covered by either Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 or
Clinton’s Executive Order 12866. 
To obtain more specific information about the impact of economic analysis in executive
branch and independent agencies, I interviewed current and past agency officials and examined agency
dockets, annual reports, and individual rules and decisions. I focused on the procedures that federal
agencies employ to catalog information on the benefits and costs of future and existing regulatory
activities.
102  This analysis complements a survey conducted by Thomas Table 11:  Federal Regulatory Agencies' Efforts to Catalog Cost and Benefit Information
Agency
a Estimates of the Future Costs and Benefits
of New Regulatory Activities
Aggregate Estimates of the Costs and





Department of Agriculture Partial No evidence No
Department of Commerce* Partial No evidence No
Department of Energy* Partial No evidence No
Department of Housing and Urban Development Partial No evidence No
Environmental Protection Agency Partial Partial Partial
Food and Drug Administration Partial Partial No
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration  Partial Partial Partial
Occupational Safety and Health Administration Partial Partial No
Independent
Commodity Futures Trading Commission No No
Consumer Product Safety Commission Partial No
Federal Communications Commission No No
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Partial No
Federal Trade Commission No No
Federal Reserve Board No No
Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation No No
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Partial No




a. For agencies marked with a (*), I have relied primarily on Bliley (1996).
b. This category does not imply that an agency does not have enough information to estimate aggregate costs and benefits, but rather that an agency does
not provide this information.  For example, executive agencies may be able to put together a rough calculation of aggregate costs and benefits by
compiling RIA estimates.
c. All executive branch agencies are required to prepare RIAs for major or economically significant rules.  The analyses do not, however, always include
comprehensive or complete estimates of costs and benefits. Hence, they are characterized as "partial."
d. Some agencies frequently estimate the costs and benefits of non-major actions.  Unfortunately, my examination of the non-major universe is not
exhaustive. Thus, I am not able to describe the size of the subset of non-major rules for which costs and benefits have been estimated.  For other
agencies, I have found no evidence that estimates are provided for non-major actions.
e. The Interstate Commerce Commission was abolished and replaced by the Surface Transportation Board in 1996.103. See Bliley (1997) and Furchtgott-Roth (1996).
104. The agencies include the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Department of Commerce, the Department
of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the
Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Surface
Transportation Board.
105. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1995). Although primarily a law enforcement agency, the Federal Trade
Commission has requirements in place to examine the projected benefits and any adverse economic effects of rules
(Bliley 1997, 114). In addition, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has completed benefit-cost analyses of
recent rules associated with the restructuring of the natural gas and electricity industries.
106. Both the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission indicated, however, that
they could calculate the total costs of regulations to their agency, other government agencies, and the private sector
(Bliley 1997).
107. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and Federal Highway Administration (1991). 
108. See Environmental Protection Agency (1990, 1996). As discussed previously, those estimates are often incomplete
and may be methodologically flawed and systematically biased. See, for example, Hahn (1996).
109. Most agencies probably have some information on the impact of their programs, but have not compiled it because
Congress or the White House does not require agencies to present such information to the public.
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J. Bliley, Jr., chairman of the House Committee on Commerce.
103  In 1996, Congressman Bliley sent
a survey to federal agencies under the committee’s jurisdiction.
104  The survey asked the agencies to
explain how they accounted for costs in the regulatory process and requested a list of documents
describing that information for fiscal year 1995 and earlier years. 
Table 11 summarizes the results from the agencies surveyed by Bliley and Hahn. The table
is divided into two parts; the first covers executive agencies, and the second covers independent
agencies. For executive agencies, the table reports the extent to which they estimate the benefits and
costs of new major rules and nonmajor rules and activities. In addition, the table reports whether the
agency has attempted to provide aggregate estimates of the economic impacts of its regulations. The
second part of the table is the same as the first except that it does not distinguish between major and
nonmajor rules, since independent agencies are not subject to oversight under the executive orders.
For the most part, I found that the agencies at least superficially comply with economic analysis
requirements. All eight of the executive branch agencies I analyzed prepare RIAs for major rules. In
addition, some of those agencies, such as OSHA, many operating agencies within the DOT, and the
EPA, estimate the benefits and costs of a subset of nonmajor rules and activities. Of the independent
agencies, only the CPSC and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission generally estimate the benefits and
costs of rules and licensing activities.
105  Only a limited number of agencies systematically evaluate the
benefits and costs of existing regulatory activities, however. None of the independent agencies
provides such cumulative estimates.
106  Of all the executive branch agencies, only the NHTSA and the
EPA provide that information. These two agencies provide only partial estimates, however. The
NHTSA along with the Federal Highway Administration have routinely estimated the cumulative
impacts of their programs over time.
107  The EPA has estimated the historical cost of all environmental
regulation as well as benefits and costs of particular programs.
108  The table reveals that agencies
provide very limited information on the benefits and costs of individual regulations. Moreover, only
two agencies attempt to provide aggregate estimates of the impacts of their regulatory programs.
109
Although agencies rarely provide estimates of aggregate benefits and costs, many review
existing programs under statutory requirements, agency initiatives, legislation, and executive
programs. While agencies have previously provided measures of success, such as the reduction in the
number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, they have generally not completed thorough
assessments of the effectiveness of such review efforts. In what is probably the most rigorous review110. See Katzen (1994).
111. When the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 is fully implemented, I may have more complete
information to assess the effectiveness of agency review programs. Under the act, agencies are required to prepare
strategic plans, comprehensive mission statements, and annual program evaluations.
112. See, for example, Arrow et al. (1996).
113. See e.g., Smith (1984), Arrow et al. (1996), Graham and Wiener  (1995, Chapter 11).
114. For more detailed discussions of those improvements, see Arrow et al. (1996), Hahn (1996), and the Office of
Management and Budget (1996).
115. See, for example, Arrow et al. (1996) and Crandall et al. (1997).
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program among all agencies, the NHTSA continually reviews the effectiveness of existing regulations
and often examines whether it has realized the projected benefits and costs.
110  Without a
comprehensive examination, which is beyond the scope of this study, it is almost impossible to
quantify the real savings that have resulted from agency reviews of their existing regulatory
structure.
111  Thus, I remain skeptical of the benefits that agencies claim to have produced from those
programs.
V.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
My analysis of the impact of federal regulatory activities on the economy shows that the net
benefits of regulation are positive, that less than half of final regulations pass a strict benefit-cost test,
that the quality of agency regulatory impact analyses is poor, and that the efficiency of regulations
varies depending on the agency and the type of risk the regulation is designed to reduce. In sum,
society could spend its regulatory dollars more wisely, and a system to allocate regulatory dollars
efficiently does not exist. To improve the regulatory process, Congress and the White House must
enforce the economic analysis requirements they support in public. They must take advantage of
existing reform proposals designed to improve agency decision making, based on decades of work
by regulatory scholars.
112  The success of such efforts requires high-level political support, adherence
to established principles of benefit-cost analysis, and rigorous review of agency analyses of
regulations by an independent entity.
113
This study, along with the work of other scholars, suggests that agencies must improve the
quality of regulatory impact analyses. Agencies could dramatically improve the quality of RIAs by
standardizing assumptions across analyses, providing a better treatment of uncertainties, defining
baselines clearly, using peer-reviewed scholarship when available, and presenting results clearly.
114
In addition, agencies could use retrospective studies of actual impacts to complement prospective
studies. Such analyses would provide a better assessment of actual benefits and costs than agencies
currently provide, and would help agencies improve prospective analytical techniques. The
improvement of regulatory impact analyses is important, but it is only one component of a larger
reform effort. An effective reform effort requires law makers to establish principles for reform and
then to identify a feasible reform agenda. Elsewhere, I articulate those principles in more detail with
my colleagues and offer an agenda for reform.
115  Here, I summarize two key points. 
First, regulatory reform should increase the accountability of elected officials for the
regulations they support. Regulations frequently impose costs on society–sometimes as much as
billions of dollars annually–that are higher than many direct government expenditure programs. To
a large extent, federal bureaucrats now make many regulatory decisions with the tacit acquiescence116. Hahn and Litan (1997).
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of legislators, the president, or both. One way society can hold elected officials accountable, for
example, is if information on the benefits and costs of regulations is accessible on the Internet.
Agencies could, for example, make all regulatory impact analyses available on-line. The government
should also provide more information on the benefits and costs of regulation. An annual regulatory
accounting statement produced by the OMB or the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), or both,
is a step in the right direction.
116  Such a statement should initially focus on the incremental benefits
and costs of regulations, but the OMB or CEA could also develop estimates of the aggregate impacts
of regulation where feasible. Congress should require both executive branch agencies and independent
regulatory agencies to help produce such estimates. If agencies examine carefully the economic
impacts of their regulations on real people more carefully, I believe they will develop more effective
and less wasteful regulation. 
Second, regulatory reform should place greater emphasis on protecting the economic well-
being of consumers and producers. As this analysis has shown, the economic benefits and costs of
a regulation are often not a decisive factor in determining whether to implement a rule. It is critical
for policymakers to consider significant economic impacts when designing a regulation. Congress
must revisit the original statutes and limit the scope of federal regulation to activities that agencies
can justify on economic grounds. Congress should also consider establishing a congressional or
independent agency responsible for replicating key findings used to support regulations before
agencies finalize the regulations.
In a sense, my recipe for reform is deceptively simple. Some would say it is simplistic. It calls
for better information to make legislators more accountable and a larger role for economic analysis
in both the design and implementation of laws designed to protect the public health and welfare.
Congress is already starting to require agencies to provide more and better information about
regulatory decisions. Given today’s political climate, a larger role for economic analysis may not be
possible. I hope, however, that as the public increasingly understands the importance of economic
analysis, law makers will respond by allowing economics to play a more prominent role in the
regulatory process. If Congress helps agencies to more effectively target social regulation, Americans
will continue to enjoy a high standard of living and know that their government is able to tackle the
nation’s most important social problems. If Congress continues to allow agencies to create
regulations without adequate attention to the full economic consequences, the standard of living that
most citizens enjoy will slowly but surely erode. I offer my simple reform agenda in the hope of
engaging legislators and policymakers interested in taking constructive action to improve the
regulatory process.49
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